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LawYer eThICS aNd The FINaNCIaL aCTIoN TaSk ForCe: a CaLL To aCTIoN
i. intrOdUCtiOn
 Investigations and prosecutions of money laundering1 and terrorist financing2 
crimes attract global media attention.3 Academic institutions and professional 
organizations are devoting more attention to these crimes and their consequences4 
1. “Money laundering is the act of converting money gained from illegal activity, such as drug smuggling, 
into money that appears legitimate and in which the source cannot be traced to the illegal activity.” Peter 
Reuter & Edwin M. Truman, How Much Money Is Laundered?, in Chasing Dirty Money: The Fight 
Against Money Laundering 9 (2004) (quoting U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, GAO/GGD-96-105, 
Money Laundering: A Framework for Understanding U.S. Efforts Overseas 1 (1996)).
2. “Terrorism financing . . . typically involves money from legal pursuits that is converted into forms that 
facilitate acts of violence for political purposes.” Reuter & Truman, supra note 1, at 9.
3. See Richard K. Gordon, Losing the War Against Dirty Money: Rethinking Global Standards on Preventing 
Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing, 21 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 503, 503–06 (2011). One 
example of an event attracting global attention concerns the French bank BNP Paribas’s guilty plea to 
charges of hiding the names of Sudanese and Iranian clients when it sent transactions through the U.S. 
financial system. Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, BNP Admits Guilt and Agrees to Pay $8.9 Billion 
Fine to U.S., N.Y. Times, July 1, 2014, at B1. The U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York 
accused BNP of “perpetrating . . . a tour de fraud.” Id. BNP’s chief operating officers allegedly ignored the 
warnings of its compliance officers in dealing with Iran and Sudan, with one BNP compliance manager 
stating that “[Sudan] hosted Osama bin Laden.” Id. BNP enlisted the help of the “highest rungs of French 
government” to avoid the charges, including “President Francois Hollande [who] made unusually direct 
and personal appeals to President [Barack] Obama” for assistance. Id.; see Susanne Craig & James C. 
McKinley, Jr., French Bank’s Guilty Plea Is Latest Big Settlement to Bolster State’s Fiscal Position, N.Y. Times, 
July 2, 2014, at A22 (noting that BNP “is the seventh major bank to be caught trying to evade United 
States sanctions in a five-year investigation” by the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office and federal 
authorities, and concluding that these investigations have led to approximately $12 billion in fines, which 
have bolstered New York’s financial position as well as that of the District Attorney’s Office); Declan 
Walsh, Britain Frees Pakistani in Financial Inquiry, N.Y. Times, June 8, 2014, at A10 (reporting that 
British police will continue to investigate the popular Pakistani political leader, Altaf Hussain, a British 
citizen since 2002, who was arrested and held for four days on suspicion of money laundering, and that 
police are also investigating whether $600,000 in cash seized during raids on Hussain’s home and office in 
2012 and 2013 are the proceeds of criminal activity). The media attention covers a wide variety of related 
matters. For example, one article discussed the selection of a possible monitor for Credit Suisse and how 
former prosecutors of entities are selected by their former government employers to be monitors, creating 
an “‘old boys’ network” for lucrative appointments to ensure entity compliance with settlement agreements. 
See Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Old Foe a Monitor of Credit Suisse, N.Y. Times, June 24, 2014, 
at B1. This network, and the lack of transparency surrounding such monitoring, raises questions about the 
efficacy of monitoring. See id. (reporting that “the consulting firm Deloitte [was fined] $10 million and 
barred . . . from advising banks in New York for one year . . . [for] watering down a report about . . . the 
British bank, Standard Chartered,” and also noting that former Deputy U.S. Attorney Shirah Neiman was 
selected to monitor BNP Paribas, which was suspected of transferring millions of dollars through its U.S. 
operations on behalf of Sudan and other countries that the United States blacklisted, noting that the bank 
is expected to pay $8 billion in penalties and plead guilty to criminal wrongdoing); id. at B7; Ben Protess, 
Senior U.S. Prosecutor Who Fought Wall St. Is Departing, N.Y. Times, June 26, 2014, at B4 (reporting that 
Lorin L. Reisner, the director of the criminal division of the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Manhattan, is the 
latest government lawyer to go “through the  .  .  .  revolving door,” back to private practice and, while in 
office, led BNP to move closer to pleading guilty for improperly transferring money for Sudan).
4. See New York Law School Law Review Symposium: Combating Threats to the International Financial 
System: The Financial Action Task Force (Apr. 25, 2014); American Bar Association Center for Professional 
Responsibility Symposium, 40th ABA National Conference on Professional Responsibility (May 29, 2014); 
American Association of Law Schools Symposium, Professional Responsibility: The Transformative Effect 
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amidst a growing consensus that money laundering and terrorist financing activities 
pose a significant risk to the economic, political, and social order of nations.5
 The gravity of this risk in the international context is reflected, in part, by the 
shopping mall killings in Nairobi, Kenya6 and an attack in Moscow, Russia in 2013,7 
both of which required significant planning and financial support.8 In the wake of 
of International Initiatives on Lawyer Practice and Regulation: A Case Study Focusing on FATF and its 
2008 Lawyer Guidance (Jan. 8, 2010). The Association of American Law Schools (AALS) program 
produced several articles published in the American Bar Association Journal of the Professional Lawyer. See, e.g., 
Paul D. Paton, Cooperation, Co-option or Coercion? The FATF Lawyer Guidance and Regulation of the Legal 
Profession, J. Prof. Law., 2010, at 165, 167 (examining, in part, “[t]he potential impact of the FATF on U.S. 
lawyer regulation” by referencing developments in Canada and Australia); Kevin L. Shepherd, The 
Gatekeeper Initiative and the Risk-Based Approach to Client Due Diligence: The Imperative for Voluntary Good 
Practices Guidance for U.S. Lawyers, J. Prof. Law., 2010, at 83 (highlighting the creation of the Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF) and dispensing advice for lawyers); Laurel S. Terry, An Introduction to the 
Financial Action Task Force and Its 2008 Lawyer Guidance, J. Prof. Law., 2010, at 3 [hereinafter Terry, Intro 
to the 2008 FATF Lawyer Guidance] (providing an overview of the FATF and related developments, such as 
the governmental responses to the FATF).
5. See Peter J. Quirk, Macroeconomic Implications of Money Laundering (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working 
Paper No. 96/66, 1996), reprinted in 2 Trends in Organized Crime 10 (1997) (“[M]oney laundering can 
distort economic data and thus distort macroeconomic analysis and policymaking. [This may have] direct 
effects on saving resulting from induced changes in income distribution and from the erosion of confidence 
in financial markets.”). Quirk concludes that money laundering has a “depressant effect on growth.” Id.; see 
also Editorial, Nigerian Girls Deserve Continued Attention: Our View, USA Today, (Aug. 5, 2014, 7:35 
PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2014/08/05/nigerian-schoolgirls-boko-haram-
bringbackourgirls-editorials-debates/13643531/; Landon Thomas, Jr. & Raphael Minder, Banco Espírito 
Santo Patriarch Humbled Amid Bailout, N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 2014, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2014/08/05/business/international/banco-esprito-santo-patriarch-humbled-amid-bailout.html 
(noting the arrest of Ricardo Silva Salgado, the former chairman of Portugal’s Banco Espírito Santo, for 
money laundering and his family’s involvement in international businesses, and reporting Europe and 
Portugal’s $6.6 billion emergency bailout of the bank on August 3, 2014 to quell rattled markets that 
harmed investors); see generally Jack Ewing, Legal Costs Push Deutsche Bank to a Loss, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 
2014, at B12 (highlighting that Deutsche Bank announced a net loss of approximately $117 million (or €92 
million) due to legal costs, in part, related to “questions about its role in financial transactions carried out 
on behalf of nations facing international sanctions”).
6. Jeffrey Gettleman & Nicholas Kulish, Mall Becomes War Zone as Gunmen Kill Dozens in Nairobi Terror 
Attack, N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 2013, at A1 (describing the terrorist attack at the Nairobi mall as the most 
“chilling” in East Africa since al-Qaeda attacked two American embassies in 1998, and noting that a 
secret U.N. report described the assault as “complex” and that an African Union official described the 
terrorists as “trained”); Daniel Howden, Terror in Nairobi: The Full Story Behind Al-Shabaab’s Mall Attack, 
Guardian, (Oct. 4, 2013, 8:09 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/westgate-mall-
attacks-kenya (providing a detailed report of the terror and mayhem of the September 21, 2013 attack on 
Nairobi’s premier shopping mall). Nicholas Kulish et al., Carnage in Mall Shows Resilience of Terror Group, 
N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 2013, at A1 (revealing “an extensive and complex financial support system” by 
Al-Shaba[a]b supporters in Kenya “to sustain their own activities, sponsor the travel of recruits to 
Somalia . . . and provide financial contributions to the jihadist cause,” and noting that Kenyan President 
Uhuru Kenyatta described this as an “international war” and stating that “we have to join hands and work 
together to see it destroyed”).
7. See Fabien Tepper, Volgograd Bomber Planned to Attack Moscow, Christian Sci. Monitor (Oct. 22, 
2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/2013/1022/Volgograd-bomber-planned-to-attack-Moscow. 
8. See Roberto Durrieu, Rethinking Money Laundering & Financing of Terrorism in International 
Law 67 (2013) (“[T]errorist[] . . . groups require financial support to finance their activities and enhance their 
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the horrific September 11, 2001 attacks, the United States has become particularly 
sensitive to terrorism and its financing.9
 The United States and nations worldwide perceive themselves in a dire struggle 
to eliminate the evils of money laundering and terrorist financing.10 The Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia recently donated $100 million to the U.N. Counter-Terrorism Centre 
to “help provide the tools, technologies and methods to confront and eliminate the 
threat of terrorism.”11 In acknowledging the gift, U.N. Secretary-General Ban 
Ki-moon stated, “The recent disturbing upsurge of terrorism in a number of countries 
and regions of the world, most dramatically demonstrated by the so-called Islamic 
State in Iraq, underscores the challenges before us.”12
power.”); id. at 66–72 (discussing the link between money laundering and terrorism financing, money 
laundering constituting one of the four ways to finance terrorism). Although overall financial support for a 
terrorist organization may be great, the cost of a particular operation may be surprisingly small. For example, 
the Central Intelligence Agency estimated that al-Qaeda’s pre–September 11, 2001 annual operating budget 
at $30 million, whereas the cost of planning and executing the attacks was less than $300,000. Id. at 67–68.
9. See generally John Roth et al., National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United 
States: Monograph on Terrorist Financing (2004), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/
staff_statements/911_TerrFin_Monograph.pdf; Am. Bar Ass’n, Voluntary Good Practices 
Guidance for Lawyers to Detect and Combat Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 
1 (2010) [hereinafter Good Practices Guidance], available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/uncategorized/criminal_justice/voluntary_good_practices_guidance.pdf (noting that the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on New York City and elsewhere prompted the FATF to issue 
Special Recommendations on terrorist f inancing); see also Jodi Rudoren, Deal Reached on Gaza 
Reconstruction, Palestinian Leader Says, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 2014, at A8 (ref lecting the United States’ 
concern over the financing of terrorism by reporting that the Palestinian Authority “maintains that it 
cannot send money to anyone affiliated with Hamas, for fear of risking financial support from . . . the 
United States” and other countries “that consider Hamas a terrorist group”). The Pentagon was also 
attacked on September 11, 2001 and United Airlines Flight 93 crashed in Pennsylvania before it could 
strike Washington, D.C. September 11th Fast Facts, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/27/us/
september-11-anniversary-fast-facts/ (last updated Sept. 8, 2014, 12:54 PM).
10. See Chad Bray, UBS and Deutsche Bank Disclose New Inquiries Over ‘Dark Pools’, N.Y. Times (July 29, 2014, 
8:26 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/07/29/ubs-and-deutsche-bank-disclose-new-inquiries-
over-dark-pools/ (discussing France’s formal investigation of UBS of Switzerland regarding charges of 
money laundering and tax fraud, claiming the bank helped French clients hide assets, and noting that UBS 
was ordered to post bail in excess of €1 billion); Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Ben Protess, Scrutiny for Banks 
Is Shifting to Germany, N.Y. Times, July 8, 2014, at B1 (reporting settlement talks with Germany’s second 
largest bank, Commerzbank, over dealings with Iran and other blacklisted countries, and that U.S. 
criminal sanctions cases against European banks began in 2009 with British bank Lloyds, followed by 
Credit Suisse, HBC, Standard Chartered, Barclays, ING of the Netherlands, and then BNP that alone 
paid a record $8.9 million penalty and plead guilty to criminal charges in 2014 for processing transactions 
with countries on the U.S. sanction list); see generally Members and Observers, Fin. Action Task Force, 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/membersandobservers/#d.en.3147 (last visited Apr. 10, 2015) 
[hereinafter Members and Observers] (listing the FATF’s national and regional members).
11. Rick Gladstone, Saudis Give $100 Million to U.N. Fight on Terrorism, N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 2014, at A8 
(quoting Abdel bin Ahmed al-Jubeir, the Saudi Ambassador to the United States). The Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia gave $10 million to help create a U.N. counterterrorism committee only three years earlier. 
Id. The recent $100 million donation ref lects the Kingdom’s continuing commitment to, and faith in, 
the importance of international cooperation in the field of counter-terrorism. Id.
12. Id. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has ruthlessly murdered religious minorities and others in 
northern Iraq and elsewhere. President Obama and others described ISIS’s threat to thousands of 
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 Addressing the United States’ “Global War on Terror,” David S. Cohen, the U.S. 
Treasury Department’s Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, 
recently said, “The United States needs to remain involved in the world, but does not 
necessarily need to remain involved just through military power.”13 Officials are 
increasingly focused on other effective ways to project American power, in particular, by 
adopting global anti-money laundering (AML) and counter terrorist financing (CTF) 
policies.14 The United States adopted such policies more than a generation earlier when 
it became a founding member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).15
 The FATF represents the gold standard in the global fight against money 
laundering and terrorist financing and promises to change the way lawyers practice 
law in the United States.16 However, the FATF, in some respects, remains a perpetual 
work in progress17 and must adapt its normative structure and methodologies to the 
increasingly sophisticated, ever-morphing criminal practices of money laundering and 
Yazidis, a religious minority, as genocide. See Rod Nordland, Despite U.S. Claims, Yazidis Say Crisis Is 
Not Over, N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 2014, at A8; Marlise Simons, Spurred by ISIS Violence, Nations Mull 
How to Press for Justice in Conflicts, N.Y. Times (Sept. 21, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/22/
world/spurred-by-isis-violence-nations-mull-how-to-press-for-justice-in-conf licts.html; Rick 
Gladstone, U.N. Pursues Bid to Stifle Rebels in Iraq, N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 2014, at A8 (highlighting that 
the United Nations is galvanized by the brutality of ISIS’s human rights violations in Iraq and is 
adopting a resolution aimed at choking their sources of money, weapons, and foreign recruits by placing 
its leaders on an international blacklist, banning their travel and freezing their assets).
13. Annie Lowrey, Aiming Financial Weapons from Treasury War Room, N.Y. Times, June 4, 2014, at B1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/04/business/aiming-financial-weapons-from-war-room-at-
treasury.html. One way for the “United States . . . to [be] involved in the world,” id., is for it to subject 
foreign banks and other companies to the United States’ regulatory scrutiny. For example, U.S. regulators 
recently criticized one of Europe’s largest banks, Deutsche Bank, for “serious problems with the bank’s 
financial reporting procedures and oversight.” Matthew Goldstein, Fed Is Said to Criticize Deutsche Bank’s 
Oversight and Reporting Efforts, N.Y. Times, July 23, 2014, at B3 (discussing the New York Federal 
Reserve Bank’s letter to Deutsche Bank directing it “to fix problems in its financial reporting procedures” 
that have existed for several years, and the U.S. efforts to ensure the financial soundness of banks).
14. See Lowrey, supra note 13. “Mr. Cohen oversees the obscure Office of Foreign Assets Control, the engine 
that creates and administers the steadily increasing number of financial sanctions” directed against Iran’s 
Revolutionary Guard to “Mexican drug traffickers to cronies of Russia’s President Vladimir V. Putin.” Id. 
Sanctions have been used to influence the policies of North Korea, South Sudan, Syria, and other nations. 
Although some economists question the impact of sanctions, one expert declared that “[t]here’s no doubt 
that sanctions have become the dominant instrument of coercive statecraft.” Id. at B5 (quoting Mark 
Dubowitz, executive director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies).
15. Durrieu, supra note 8, at 121 n.396.
16. See id. at 121 (writing that the FATF provides the key legal standards for fighting money laundering 
and terrorist f inancing); see also Paul Allan Schott, Reference Guide to Anti-Money 
Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism, at I-3 (2d ed. 2006) (referring to the 
FATF as the “international standard setter for anti-money laundering (AML) efforts”); see discussion 
infra Part III (describing the origin, mission, and organizational or normative structure of the FATF). 
17. See Navin Beekarry, The International Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism 
Regulatory Strategy: A Critical Analysis of Compliance Determinants in International Law, 31 Nw. J. Int’l 
L. & Bus. 137, 142 (2011) (“The FATF [AML and comabting the financing of terroism (CFT)] 
normative structure . . . constantly adapt[s] to new and changing [money laundering (ML) and terrorist 
financing (TF)] activities and methodologies.”). 
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terrorist financing.18 The FATF must also continually ensure that its member states 
are complying with the FATF’s AML and CTF standards.19 Some leaders in the legal 
profession are concerned with the effect that current FATF policies have on lawyers, 
and are especially worried about possible future changes in FATF policies that could 
affect the delivery of legal services.20
 This article discusses the FATF and its potential impact on the delivery of legal 
services in the United States.21 Part II briefly discusses the problems associated with 
money laundering and terrorist financing. Part III examines the history and scope of 
the FATF, including its expansive Recommendations designed to prevent these 
crimes. Part IV considers some of the ethical dimensions of the FATF’s policies and 
their impact both on the legal profession and the delivery of legal services. Specifically, 
18. See Lucia Dalla Pellegrina & Donato Masciandaro, The Risk-Based Approach in the New European Anti-
Money Laundering Legislation: A Law and Economics View, 5 Rev. L. & Econ. 931, 936 (2009) (acknowledging 
that money launderers have a deep knowledge of AML detection risks and “take counter-measures to hide 
their financial activities,” demanding greater cooperation and reporting by financial institutions); Schott, 
supra note 16, at ix (“Efforts to launder money and finance terrorism have been evolving rapidly in recent 
years in response to heightened countermeasures.”); Shima Baradaran et al., Funding Terror, 162 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 477, 489 (2014) (“Traffickers constantly employ the latest technologies to keep one step ahead of law 
enforcement efforts.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see generally infra Part III.
19. See Ben Protess & Chad Bray, Caught Backsliding, Standard Chartered Is Fined $300 Million, N.Y. Times, 
Aug. 20, 2014, at B1 (reporting that Standard Chartered failed to honor an earlier promise “to weed out 
transactions prone to money-laundering” and was fined $300 million, on top of $667 million in fines in 
2012 for dealing with blacklisted countries, and that the Standard Chartered, New York branch is 
suspended from the important business of “dollar clearing,” affecting approximately 300 clients); Jessica 
Silver-Greenberg & Ben Protess, British Bank Faces Action, Again, by New York State, N.Y. Times, Aug. 
6, 2014, at B1 (covering New York’s action against Standard Chartered over a breakdown in its computer 
system that detects transactions vulnerable to money laundering, and the bank’s claim that the problems 
were merely “technical” and not corporate recidivism since the bank was fined $340 million in 2012).
20. Professor Paul D. Paton discusses two FATF polices creating concern in the legal profession: 
Recommendation 12, which requires lawyers to follow certain client due diligence protocols; and 
Recommendation 16, which requires lawyers to report confidential client information involving 
suspicious transactions. See Paton, supra note 4, at 170. “Both [Recommendations] place demands that 
interfere with the traditional self-regulating approach and independence of the legal profession.” Id. at 
170–71; see also Good Practices Guidance, supra note 9, at 3 (expressing concern about FATF-related 
regulation of the profession by the federal government and describing goals “to encourage lawyers to 
develop and implement voluntary, but effective, risk-based approaches consistent with the [FATF] 
Lawyer Guidance, thereby negating the need for federal regulation of the legal profession”).
21. This article ref lects my involvement in New York Law School’s 2014 symposium entitled “Combating 
Threats to the International Financial System: The Financial Action Task Force,” the first academic 
event hosted by a law school to address these important issues. New York Law School Law Review 
Symposium: Combating Threats to the International Financial System: The Financial Action Task 
Force (Apr. 25, 2014); see Laurel S. Terry, U.S. Legal Profession Efforts to Combat Money Laundering & 
Terrorist Financing, 59 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 487, 488 (2014 –2015) (noting New York Law School’s 
groundbreaking academic symposium). The AALS Professional Responsibility Section also sponsored 
an academic program entitled “The Transformative Effect of International Initiatives on Lawyer 
Practice and Regulation: A Case Study Focusing on FATF and Its 2008 Lawyer Guidance” at the 
AALS’s Annual Meeting in Washington, D.C. in 2010, which is available at: https://memberaccess.
aals.org/eweb/DynamicPage.aspx?webcode=SesDetails&ses_key=e7ca3e51-5520-4238-b04d-
5e7e7aaaed2f (last visited Apr. 10, 2015); see also Terry, Intro to the 2008 FATF Lawyer Guidance, supra 
note 4 (providing a broad but comprehensive overview of the topic).
463
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 59 | 2014/15
Part IV asserts that the FATF’s Customer Due Diligence (CDD) Recommendations 
offer lawyers a valuable tool for avoiding clients who are involved in money laundering 
or terrorist financing.22 Part IV also addresses, from an interdisciplinary perspective, 
the reasons why some in the legal profession resist FATF policies.
 This article concludes by arguing that the FATF merits the legal profession’s 
continued attention. Some FATF efforts are troubling, particularly Recommendation 
20, which suggests that lawyers should secretly file suspicious transaction reports (STRs) 
on certain clients.23 However, other FATF efforts represent positive developments for 
the bar. For example, lawyers are well-advised to embrace the FATF’s CDD 
Recommendations as a good practice standard.24 The legal profession should be careful 
about dismissing useful changes to the practice of law merely because external authorities 
drive those changes.25 The conclusion also recommends ways for the profession to better 
implement the FATF’s CDD Recommendations.
ii. MOnEY LaUndEring: sOCiEtY’s hiddEn CanCEr
 A. An Overview of the Problem 
 This part of the article briefly examines money laundering to provide a context for 
considering lawyer ethics issues in light of the FATF’s mission to eliminate this crime.26 
22. In this article, “CDD” refers to “customer due diligence,” and tracks the FATF’s use of that abbreviation 
to promote consistency with FATF terminology. CDD could just as appropriately refer to “client due 
diligence,” since “client” is a more common way of referring to a lawyer’s customer.
23. Fin. Action Task Force, The FATF Recommendations 20 (Feb. 15, 2012) [hereinafter 2012 
Recommendations], available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/
pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf (calling for lawyers to file suspicious transaction reports (STRs) with 
financial intelligence units); see also Am. Bar Ass’n, Formal Opinion 463: Client Due Diligence, 
Money Laundering, and Terrorist Financing (May 23, 2013) [hereinafter Formal Opinion 463], 
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/
formal_opinion_463.authcheckdam.pdf. Formal Opinion 463 emphasizes that “mandatory reporting of 
suspicion about a client is in conflict with [the American Bar Association (ABA) Model] Rules [of 
Professional Conduct] 1.6 and 1.8.” Id. at 1. Cf. Dru Stevenson, Against Confidentiality, 48 U.C. Davis L. 
Rev. 337, 337, 393–94 n.256 (2014) (arguing from a Coasean economics perspective that the profession’s 
confidentiality rules are unnecessary and, worse yet, “undermine public trust in the legal system and 
diminish transparency and cooperation in society,” and reporting that empirical studies demonstrate that 
clients do not rely on confidentiality rules when communicating with their lawyers).
24. 2012 Recommendations, supra note 23, at 19 (Recommendation 22) (mandating that lawyers and 
other designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs) are subject to the FATF’s 
extensive CDD regime).
25. See Jack P. Sahl, Cracks in the Profession’s Monopoly Armor, 82 Fordham L. Rev. 2635, 2636 n.6 (2014) 
(“‘[S]tate supreme courts were  .  .  .  the prime regulators [and] typically act[ed] in interplay with the 
bar’” . . . and “lawyers drafted rules to promote their own interests in a self-regulatory context.” (footnotes 
omitted) (quoting John Leubsdorf, Legal Ethics Falls Apart, 57 Buff. L. Rev. 959, 965 (2009)).
26. See Durrieu, supra note 8, at 429 (“Legal practitioners and scholars . . . dive into the legal devices against 
[money laundering and terrorist financing] without enough consideration to the extra-legal factors. 
However, it is critically important to understand the contours of the problem before any useful legal 
discussion and policy recommendation is derived. . . . [W]e need to understand the meaning, causes and 
effects of these phenomena . . . .”).
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The line between money laundering and terrorism financing is occasionally blurry 
because the proceeds of money laundering may be used to fund terrorism.27 There are, 
however, important differences between the two.28 For example, unlike money 
laundering, terrorism financing may stem from legitimate funding sources, such as 
private donations.29 Most importantly, the primary goal of money laundering is to 
realize criminal financial gains.30 By contrast, the primary goal of terrorism financing 
is to instill terror from acts of violence, or threats thereof, to further a political purpose.31 
Although an in-depth discussion regarding the complexities of terrorist financing is 
beyond the scope of this article, this distinction is important to note.
 Prior to 1986, money laundering was not a crime anywhere in the world; now, over 
170 countries have criminalized it.32 It is difficult to discern the amount of money being 
laundered at a given time for several reasons. First, the crime of money laundering is 
geared towards secrecy because of the desire to conceal the source of illegal funds that 
are later converted to legitimate purposes.33 Second, money launderers often move funds 
across national borders to further obfuscate the origins of illegal funds by taking 
advantage of the differences between countries’ political, legal, and economic regimes.34
27. See Durrieu, supra note 8, at 66–72 (discussing generally the nexus between money laundering and terrorist 
financing, and noting that “terrorist groups also need to practice money laundering, after committing a 
crime”). “[T]he terrorist group, Al-Qaeda, [receives] about forty percent of its funds from drug trafficking, 
twenty percent from extortion, and about ten percent from kidnapping.” Id. at 69 (citing Fletcher Baldwin, 
Organized Crime, Terrorism, and Money Laundering in the Americas, 15 Fla. J. Int’l L. 3, 4 (2002)); see also 
Protess & Bray, supra note 19, (recognizing the connection between money laundering and terrorism). “If a 
bank fails to live up to its commitments, there should be consequences. That is particularly true in an area 
as serious as anti-money-laundering compliance, which is vital to helping prevent terrorism and vile human 
rights abuses.” Id. (quoting New York State’s principal bank regulator, Superintendent of Financial Services, 
Ben Lawsky). New York regulators recently reopened their investigation of Standard Chartered and are 
considering revisiting settlements with some of the world’s biggest banks. Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-
Greenberg, Prosecutors Suspect Repeat Offenses on Wall Street, N.Y. Times (Oct. 29, 2014, 3:56 PM), http://
dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/29/prosecutors-wrestling-with-wall-streets-repeat-offenders/ (“The cycle 
of misbehavior [(i.e., conducting transactions involving blacklisted countries)] is difficult to break”).
28. See Durrieu, supra note 8, at 9 (emphasizing that money laundering must be excluded from the 
definition of terrorist financing).
29. Id. at 71.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 66–67.
32. In 1986, the United States and the United Kingdom were the first two countries to criminalize money 
laundering, and criminalization moved quickly to the international level with the signature of the 
Vienna Convention in 1988. Id. at 101. Roberto Durrieu argues that money laundering first evolved in 
the 1970s in the United States and not in the 1980s as many scholars suggest, specifically noting the 
U.S. Bank Secrecy Act enacted on October 26, 1970 as “the first effective effort to detect and sanction 
the problem of hiding ill-gotten assets from law enforcement, [a process] which  .  .  . later on  .  .  . 
acquire[d] the label of ‘money laundering law.’” Id. at 99 (footnote omitted).
33. Reuter & Truman, supra note 1, at 9.
34. See Schott, supra note 16, at I-6. See generally Alison Smale, Austrian Court Unblocks Assets of Former 
U.S. Ambassador’s Wife, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 2014, at A8 (reporting on an international investigation 
by the U.S. Department of Justice of possible money laundering and tax evasion involving a former U.S. 
ambassador, Zalmay Khalilzad, and his wife).
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 While the total amount of money currently being laundered is hard to quantify, it 
is generally believed to be enormous. It is estimated that “[c]riminals, especially drug 
traffickers, may have laundered around $1.6 trillion, or 2.7 per cent of global [gross 
domestic product (GDP)], in 2009, according to a new report by [the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime].”35 This enormous amount appears to continue a trend, as 
the International Monetary Fund estimated in 1996, that the aggregate amount of 
laundered funds was between two and five percent of the world’s annual GDP, equaling 
between $590 billion and $1.5 trillion.36 Another report near that time provided an 
even greater estimate, noting that in 1995 alone, $2.85 trillion was laundered globally.37
 Money laundering often occurs in countries with complex and highly developed 
financial systems that facilitate the initial placement or deposit of funds into accounts, 
securities, or insurance instruments.38 The funds are then “layered” and moved 
through national and international financial systems to sanitize their origin.39
 B. The Corrosive Effects of Money Laundering
 Regardless of where it occurs, successful money laundering permits criminals to 
“use[] their financial gains to expand their criminal pursuits and foster[] illegal 
activities such as corruption, drug trafficking, [and the] illicit trafficking and 
exploitation of human beings.”40 Money laundering also imperils the reputation of 
35. Press Release, United Nations Office on Drugs & Crime, UNODC Estimates that Criminals May 
Have Laundered US$1.6 Trillion in 2009 (Oct. 25, 2011), available at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/
press/releases/2011/October/unodc-estimates-that-criminals-may-have-laundered-usdollar-1.6-
trillion-in-2009.html.
36. See Schott, supra note 16, at I-6 to -7. (citing Vito Tanzi, Money Laundering and the International 
Finance System 3–4 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 96/55, 1996)).
37. John Walker & Brigitte Unger, Measuring Global Money Laundering: “The Walker Gravity Model”, 5 Rev. 
L. & Econ. 821, 824 (2009).
38. See Schott, supra note 16, at I-7.
39. Id. at II-1. A money laundering scheme generally has three phases, “placement,” “layering,” and 
“integration.” Diane Marie Amann, Spotting Money Launderers: A Better Way to Fight Organized Crime?, 
27 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 199, 214–15 (2000). Professor Amann describes the process as follows:
During the placement phase, illegal proceeds are consolidated—often by filtering 
through a casino, restaurant, or other high-cash-volume front business—then sent 
outside the United States via electronic transfer or physical transport. During the 
layering phase, funds are deposited in a bank in a haven jurisdiction—so called because 
the jurisdiction enforces bank secrecy and permits anonymous shell corporations—then 
transferred to the local branch of a reputable international, often European, bank. 
During the integration phase, funds are wired from the branch to the main bank, then 
returned to the United States for use as apparently legitimate funds.
 Id. at 214–15 (footnotes omitted); see also Lisa A. Barbot, Money Laundering: An International Challenge, 
3 Tul. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 161, 167 (1995) (identifying “the Bahamas, Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, 
Costa Rica, Hong Kong, the Netherlands, Switzerland, [and] Panama” as “haven” jurisdictions).
40. Schott, supra note 16, at II-1; see also Scott Shane & Ben Hubbard, ISIS Displaying a Deft Command of 
Varied Media, N.Y. Times (Aug. 30, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/31/world/middleeast/isis-
displaying-a-deft-command-of-varied-media.html (describing the terrorist group as “f lush with wealth 
from kidnappings, oil piracy, bank robbery and extortion,” representing a formidable challenge).
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national financial systems and the stability of individual institutions identified as 
money laundering participants.41 For example, depositors and borrowers will transfer 
their business from such institutions to safer financial partners, reducing a bank’s 
source of funding and weakening a bank’s loan portfolio.42
 There are other reasons for establishing a world order against money laundering 
besides its potential negative impact on nations’ financial systems.43 Those reasons 
include the desire to: (1) undermine organized crime;44 (2) ensure morally that crime 
should not pay;45 (3) promote the administration of justice by effectively investigating 
the secretive crime of money laundering, which should facilitate the investigations of 
the predicate offenses, a key public interest;46 and (4) preclude money laundering 
from undermining the stability and security of countries.47
 Ultimately, money laundering is a hidden, complex, and serious global problem that 
persists, and perhaps has even increased since the Great Recession despite national and 
international efforts to eliminate it.48 World leaders recognize that the ability to prevent 
money laundering transcends any single nation’s resources and enforcement efforts,49 
and ultimately requires coherent standards and a globally harmonized legal approach.50
iii. thE fatf’s gEnEsis and sCOpE
 A. The FATF Structure and Mandate
 In 1989, the ministers of the world’s major industrialized nations created the 
FATF to coordinate efforts to prevent money laundering within the international 
41. See Schott, supra note 16, at II-4 to -5.
42. Id. at II-5.
43. See Durrieu, supra note 8, at 76 (concluding that there is no consensus in the academy regarding the 
reasons for prohibiting money laundering, and noting one author’s belief that the inability to control the 
increase in transnational crime has prompted more rhetoric and effort to establish an “international 
monetary movement enforcement regime”).
44. Id. at 78–80.
45. Id. at 89–91.
46. Id. at 91–92.
47. Id. at 92–93.
48. See Durrieu, supra note 8, at 445; see, e.g., Baradaran et al., supra note 18, at 480–84; James K. Jackson, 
Congressional Research Service Report RS21904: The Financial Action Task Force: An 
Overview 8 (2012) [hereinafter CRS Report], available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
RS21904.pdf (“The economic implications of money laundering and terrorist financing pose another set 
of issues that argue for gaining greater control over this type of activity. According to the [International 
Monetary Fund], money laundering accounts for between $600 billion and $1.6 trillion in economic 
activity annually.”).
49. See Durrieu, supra note 8, at 445 (reporting that the United Nations Security Council has endorsed the 
FATF, supporting international action to combat money laundering).
50. Id.
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financial system and member states’ domestic systems.51 The FATF is an unelected, 
inter-governmental body devoid of lawmaking authority; rather, it relies on the 
political will of its members to adopt AML and CTF standards.52 The FATF is 
comprised of thirty-four countries and two regional organizations,53 with an additional 
eight associate members and thirty observers.54
 The FATF’s mandate is broad: to combat money laundering, terrorist financing, 
the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and other threats to 
the integrity of the international financial system.55 In 1990, the FATF developed a 
comprehensive master plan called the Forty Recommendations,56 which were 
51. See Good Practices, supra note 9, at 1; 2012 Recommendations, supra note 23. The FATF initially 
focused on AML measures, but later adopted Recommendations specifically targeting the financing of 
terrorism.
52. See Shepherd, supra note 4, at 85; Andrew de Lotbinière McDougall, International Arbitration and Money 
Laundering, 20 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 1021, 1029–31 (2005) (brief ly summarizing the FATF’s origins).
53. FATF Members include Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, the 
European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, the Gulf Co-operation Council, Hong 
Kong, Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kingdom of the Netherlands (i.e., the Netherlands, Antilles, 
and Aruba), Luxembourg, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Republic of South Korea, the 
Russian Federation, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. Members and Observers, supra note 10; see also Shepherd, supra note 4, 
at 85; Terry, supra note 21; Durrieu, supra note 8, at 121. The FATF charter members include the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, and Japan. See Durrieu, supra note 8, at 
121 n.396; see also Shepherd, supra note 4, at 85–86 nn.4–6 (noting that in 1989, world leaders created 
the FATF to “develop and promote national and international policies to combat money laundering and 
terrorist financing”).
54. The associate FATF members are: the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), the Caribbean 
Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), the Council of Europe’s Committee of Experts on the 
Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL), the 
Eurasian Group (EAG), the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group 
(ESAAMLG), the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering in South America (GAFISUD), 
the Inter-Governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), and the 
Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF). Members and Observers, 
supra note 10; see also Shepherd, supra note 4, at 85 n.6.
55. Who We Are, Fin. Action Task Force, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2015); 
see also Terry, Intro to the 2008 FATF Lawyer Guidance, supra note 4, at 5–9 (providing an excellent discussion 
of the FATF’s origins); see generally Shawn Donnan, A Qualified Defence of Economic Complexity, Fin. Times 
(July 20, 2014, 7:05 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/7b91cee6-0ce1-11e4-bf1e-00144feabdc0.
html#axzz3SWbFwzxJ (reviewing the book The Butterfly Defect and noting its author’s warning that 
“globalisation is now so complex—and stretched so thin in some cases—that it is extremely vulnerable to 
relatively small events that pose much larger risks,” and that the hyper-interconnectedness of the world 
amplifies the consequences of local events).
56. Shepherd, supra note 4, at 85–86 & nn.4–6; see also United States, Fin. Action Task Force, http://
www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/u-z/unitedstates/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2015); United Kingdom, Fin. Action 
Task Force, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/u-z/unitedkingdom/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2015); 
Germany, Fin. Action Task Force, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/d-i/germany/ (last visited Apr. 
10, 2015); France, Fin. Action Task Force, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/d-i/france/ (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2015); Italy, Fin. Action Task Force, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/d-i/italy/ (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2015); Japan, Fin. Action Task Force, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/j-m/japan/ 
(last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
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designed to avoid interfering with legitimate economic transactions and “consist of 
four major sections: (a) the framework of the Forty Recommendations, (b) the role of 
national legal systems in combatting money laundering, (c) the role of financial 
systems in combatting money laundering, and (d) international cooperation.”57
 The FATF employs a three-pronged strategy to combat money laundering and 
terrorist financing. First, the FATF establishes standards; second, it promotes the 
“effective implementation of legal, regulatory and operational measures,” and third, 
it identifies money laundering and terrorist financing threats.58 As a political matter, 
each FATF member must agree in writing to support the Recommendations and 
policies, and submit to periodic Mutual Evaluations.59
 Shortly after the September 11, 2011 attacks on the United States, the FATF 
adopted another eight Recommendations, and an additional Recommendation in 
October 2004, to help eliminate terrorist financing. These nine new Recommendations 
supplemented the initial forty and became commonly known as the “40+9 
Recommendations.”60 The United Nations Security Council underscored the 
importance of the Recommendations by expressly endorsing them in 2005.61 In 
2012, the FATF replaced the 40+9 Recommendations with a set of reformulated 
Recommendations, now known as either the Forty Recommendations or FATF 
Recommendations,62 and today they, along with their Interpretive Notes, “constitute 
the international standards for combating money laundering and terrorist financing.”63
 The FATF Recommendations direct members to develop risk-based rules for 
preventing money laundering and terrorist financing. Unlike a rules-based approach, a 
risk-based approach offers two benefits.64 First, it conserves members’ limited resources 
57. Shepherd, supra note 4, at 86; see generally Sam Fleming et al., Regulators Split on Too-Big-to-Fail Banks, 
Fin. Times ( July 20, 2014, 6:41 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/98e3f7d2-0e83-11e4- 
b1c4-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3SWbFwzxJ (highlighting the enormous difficulty in developing a 
consensus concerning “the problem of banks that are too big to be permitted to fail” because of different 
“countries’ legal regimes, corporate structures and banking traditions”).
58. See Who We Are, supra note 55.
59. Shepherd, supra note 4, at 85–86; see infra notes 83–87 and accompanying text (discussing the 
consequences for failing to support the FATF’s policies).
60. See Good Practices Guidance, supra note 9, at 1; Terry, supra note 21, at 489.
61. See Durrieu, supra note 8, at 122 (citing S.C. Res. 1617, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1617 (July 29, 2005)).
62. Although the 2012 consolidation reduced the 40+9 Recommendations to forty, the new Forty 
Recommendations fully incorporate the substance of the nine post–9/11 provisions. See Terry, supra note 
21, at 489 & nn.5–7.
63. Good Practices Guidance, supra note 9, at 1; see also Shepherd, supra note 4, at 88; Durrieu, supra 
note 8 at 121 (asserting that the Forty Recommendations are “the key legal standards in the global 
policy against [money laundering] and [terrorist financing]”).
64. Formal Opinion 463, supra note 23, at 2 (describing the “rules-based approach [as] requir[ing] 
compliance with every element of detailed laws, rules, or regulations irrespective of the underlying 
quantum or degree of risk”).
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for combatting AML and CFT activities.65 Second, the risk-based strategy allows 
members to focus their limited resources on situations and persons that pose the greatest 
risk of money laundering and terrorist financing.66 For example, Recommendations 4 
through 25 outline risk-based preventative measures for financial institutions and, on a 
more limited basis, for designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs), 
such as realtors and lawyers, to combat money laundering.67 These same AML 
preventative measures apply to terrorist financing.68
 The Recommendations’ preventative measures become de facto mandatory 
obligations for FATF members who want to avoid being found noncompliant.69 
Generally, the Recommendations are sufficiently flexible to allow a country to adopt 
rules compatible with its economic circumstances and legal system.70 For example, 
Recommendation 23 provides that lawyers and other DNFBPs “should be required to 
report suspicious transactions when, on behalf of or for a client, they engage in financial 
transactions in relation to the activities described in paragraph (d) of Recommendation 
22.”71 The list covers a broad range of legal services including: “[the] buying and selling 
of real estate; managing of client money, securities or other assets; management of 
bank, savings or securities accounts; organisation of contributions for the creation, 
operation or management of companies; creation, operation or management of legal 
persons or arrangements, and buying and selling of business entities.”72
 The notion of lawyers filing STRs prompted significant controversy within legal 
professions from around the world, with opponents arguing that the policy violated 
principles of confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege and that it might 
interfere with the administration of justice and rule of law.73 The controversy caused 
the FATF to adopt an Interpretative Note to Recommendation 23, which provides 
65. See Good Practices Guidance, supra note 9, at 2–3 (encouraging “the legal profession generally” to 
voluntarily develop risk-based strategies that comport with “the practical realities of the practice of law”); 
see also Shepherd, supra note 4, at 85–86 (noting that in 1989, world leaders created the FATF to “develop 
and promote national and international policies to combat money laundering and terrorist financing”).
66. Good Practices Guidance, supra note 9, at 2–3.
67. Schott, supra note 16, at VI-2. Some rules sound less risk-based and generally more proscriptive, such 
as Recommendation 3, which suggests that members criminalize money laundering. See 2012 
Recommendations, supra note 23, at 12; Shepherd, supra note 4, at 89.
68. Schott, supra note 16, at II-2.
69. FATF members who are found noncompliant may face a diminished international reputation. Id. at III-11; 
see also infra notes 79–92 and accompanying text (explaining potential sanctions and their consequences).
70. Schott, supra note 16, at II-1.
71. 2012 Recommendations, supra note 23, at 20.
72. Id.
73. See Terry, supra note 21, at 492 (“Given the legal profession’s important role with respect to the 
administration of justice  .  .  . the legal profession thought it was important to have  .  .  . its situation 
[addressed separately,] rather than including it with casinos, precious metal dealers, and others.”); Ellen 
S. Podgor, Regulating Lawyers: Same Theme, New Context, J. Prof. Law., 2010, at 19 (“As [the FATF] 
[R]ecommendations move from policy into practicality, it is important to consider the appropriate 
balance needed to maintain a strong adversarial system of justice.”). Professor Podgor also notes that 
470
LAWYER ETHICS AND THE FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE: A CALL TO ACTION NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 59 | 2014/15
that lawyers “are not required to report [suspicious transactions] if the relevant 
information was obtained in circumstances where they are subject to professional 
secrecy or legal professional privilege.”74 Ref lecting the f lexibility in the FATF 
Recommendations, and in accordance with their legal system, U.S. lawyers are not 
required to file STRs to Intelligence Units, unlike their counterparts in Great Britain 
and elsewhere.75
 B. The FATF’s Enforcement Policies
 The FATF ultimately enforces its standards in two ways.76 First, FATF members 
complete an annual self-assessment questionnaire concerning their implementation 
of FATF policies,77 and the answers are reviewed by the FATF to ensure compliance 
with the relevant standards.78 Second, there is a peer-review process through a 
“Mutual Evaluation,” in which FATF members review each other and non-FATF 
members for voluntary compliance with FATF’s standards.79 This FATF 
some of these policy decisions may compromise the attorney’s role as advocate for the client, id. at 196, 
and that protecting confidential attorney-client communications is an important principle, id. at 195.
74. 2012 Recommendations, supra note 23, at 83. The FATF Interpretive Notes provide clarification and 
guidance concerning the application of particular Recommendations. See Shepherd supra, note 4, at 87.
75. See Formal Opinion 463, supra note 23 (“[M]andatory reporting of suspicion about a client is in 
conflict with Rules 1.6 and 1.18, and reporting without informing the client is in conflict with Rule 
1.4(a)(5).”); see also James T. Gathii, The Financial Action Task Force and Global Administrative Law, J. 
Prof. Law., 2010, at 197, 207 & n.48 (noting that the ABA has resisted the mandatory reporting of 
STRs, even though STRs are required for financial institutions and DNFBPs under the USA 
PATRIOT Act); see generally Arnold & Porter LLP, The Role of Lawyers in the Fight Against 
Corruption: A Summary Report (2013) [hereinafter Role of Lawyers], available at http://www.
trust.org/contentAsset/raw-data/af585d7d-6a7f-4c65-9b5c-3b5534118c74/file (considering legal issues 
surrounding corruption and, in part, the different ethical approaches to disclosure and reporting for 
lawyers based on a comparative survey of seventeen international jurisdictions including the United 
States). “[T]here is no universal approach to the  .  .  . responsibilities of lawyers when dealing with 
corrupt practices,” but “it seems likely that more  .  .  . countries will follow the trend of increased 
disclosure championed by the European Union and the United States.” Id. at 5–6.
76. See generally Fin. Action Task Force, Methodology for Assessing Technical Compliance with 
the FATF Recommendations and the Effectiveness of AML/CFT Systems (Feb. 2013) 
[hereinafter Methodology], available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/methodology/
fatf%20methodology%2022%20feb%202013.pdf.
77. See Schott, supra note 16, at III-9. For an example of a completed questionnaire, see Gibraltar’s 2002 
self-assessment, which is available at: http://www.fsc.gi/download/terrorism/terrorismselfassess.pdf.
78. See Durrieu, supra note 8, at 124.
79. See Fin. Action Task Force, AML/CFT Evaluations and Assessments (2009), available at http://
www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Handbook%20for%20assessors.pdf. The Handbook 
provides the following:
[A] typical assessment team will consist of four experts who should come from different 
countries, and whose expertise must cover all aspects of the fight against money 
laundering and the financing of terrorism. For larger or more complex jurisdictions, 
additional experts could be required. Each evaluation/assessment team should therefore 
be comprised of: a legal expert (a judge, a prosecutor or a Ministry of Justice representative); 
two financial experts (experts in regulatory matters: from a Finance Ministry, a Central 
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comprehensive peer review mechanism integrates international law concepts and has 
been described as the “landmark achievement of the FATF regime,”80 which has 
“developed into a credible compliance assessment process, analyzing both members’ 
and nonmembers’ compliance with [FATF] standards.”81
 The FATF Mutual Evaluation process incentivizes member countries “to become 
more proactive in enforcement through a higher level of participation and involvement.”82 
The United States and others wish to avoid being judged as noncompliant with FATF 
standards, in part, to avoid being identified on a publicly available list as a “non-
cooperative countr[y] and territor[y]” (NCCT),83 jeopardizing their governments’ 
political standing both at home and abroad. “An NCCT country is encouraged to make 
rapid progress in remedying its deficiencies,” as deficient countries and territories risk 
having their FATF membership suspended.84 Noncompliance adversely reflects on 
Bank or a regulatory authority. Expertise regarding the preventive measures is necessary 
both for the financial sector and for the experts in preventive measures applied by 
designated non-financial businesses and professions); and a law enforcement expert (from 
operational services such as the police, customs or a financial intelligence unit).
 Id. at 6; see also Methodology, supra note 76, at 120 (Evaluation Template published for use by assessors).
80. Beekarry, supra note 17, at 143.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 144; see also Navin Beekarry, The International Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing 
of Terrorism Regulatory Strategy, 31 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 137, 144 (2011) (reporting an increase in the 
number of countries participating “in the global AML/CTF initiatives and . . . adopt[ing] legislation” as a 
“good indication of countries’ changing [their] behavior” and that 184 jurisdictions endorsed the FATF 
standards, constituting more than eighty-five percent of the world and underscoring the long reach of the 
compliance process); see generally 2012 Recommendations, supra note 23, at 26 (“Countries should ensure 
that there is a range of effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions, whether criminal, civil or 
administrative, available to deal with natural or legal persons covered by Recommendations 6, and 8 to 23, 
that fail to comply with the AML/CTF requirements. Sanctions should be applicable not only to financial 
institutions and DNFBPs, but also to their directors and senior management.” (Recommendation 35)).
83. See Schott, supra note 16, at III-10. The United States will have its Fourth Mutual Evaluation in 2015. See 
Fin. Action Task Force, Global Assessments Calendar (2014), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/
media/fatf/documents/assessments/Global-assessment-calendar.pdf. The last evaluation, in 2006, found 
the United States partially compliant on four points and noncompliant on three. See Terry, Intro to the 2008 
FATF Lawyer Guidance, supra note 4 (providing a helpful explanation and chart of the noncompliant and 
partially compliant ratings for the United States from the 2006 FATF Third Mutual Evaluation).
84. Schott, supra note 16, at III-10. As James K. Jackson, a Specialist in International Trade and Finance 
at the Congressional Research Service, noted in his 2012 report: “[The] FATF has no enforcement 
capability, but can suspend member countries that fail to comply on a timely basis with its guidelines. 
Recently, the FATF warned Turkey that its membership will be suspended in 2013 unless it becomes 
more aggressive in criminalizing money laundering.” CRS Report, supra note 48, at 1. The following 
year, however, the FATF reported:
On 7 February 2013, the Turkish Grand National Assembly adopted the Law on the 
Prevention of the Financing of Terrorism, which was signed into law on 15 February 
2013. The new law addresses many of the shortcomings identified in Turkey’s terrorist 
financing offence and creates the legal basis for the freezing of terrorist assets. The 
FATF welcomes this significant step made by Turkey, which improves the country’s 
compliance with the international standards. As a consequence, the FATF has decided 
not to suspend Turkey’s membership.
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nations’ reputations to honor their international obligations and potentially exposes 
them to a system of sanctions, such as “blacklisting . . . accompanied by countermeasures.”85 
The mere threat of being blacklisted often causes noncompliant countries to expeditiously 
cure their deficiencies.86
 There are potentially severe consequences for financial institutions and related 
enterprises that deal with blacklisted countries. For example, in 2012, the New York 
State Department of Financial Services (NYDFS) fined the British bank Standard 
Chartered $667 million for processing transactions for Iran and other countries 
blacklisted by the United States.87 In another “related enterprise” case, the prominent 
accounting firm, Price Waterhouse-Coopers (PWC), settled a claim in 2014 with 
the NYDFS for $25 million.88 In that case, the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ was 
under regulatory scrutiny for conducting business with Iran and other blacklisted 
countries, including routing some transactions through its New York branch.89 PWC 
reviewed the transactions and submitted a report to regulators that it certified as 
objective and impartial but, at the bank’s request, deleted language noting the bank’s 
“special instructions” to employees to avoid drawing attention to transactions with 
countries under U.S. sanctions.90
In spite of this positive step, there still remain a number of ongoing shortcomings in the 
Turkish counter-terrorist financing regime. Turkey must address these shortcomings in 
order to reach a satisfactory level of compliance with the FATF standards. Turkey has 
committed to addressing these deficiencies and will submit, prior to the next FATF 
meeting in June 2013, a report on how these deficiencies are being addressed.
 Outcomes of the FATF Plenary, 20–22 February 2013, Fin. Action Task Force, http://www.fatf-gafi.
org/countries/s-t/turkey/documents/outcomesofthefatfplenary20-22february2013.html (last updated 
Mar. 8, 2013).
85. Beekarry, supra note 17, at 143 (noting the international concepts of “compliance, implementation and 
effectiveness”); see also J.C. Sharman, Power and Discourse in Policy Diffusion: Anti-Money Laundering in 
Developing States, 52 Int’l Stud. Q. 635, 652–53 (2008) (discussing how blacklisting, along with other 
forces, have promoted the international spread of AML policies in developing countries); Shepherd, 
supra note 4, at 83.
86. J.C. Sharman,  The Bark Is the Bite: International Organizations and Blacklisting  3 
(2004),  available at  http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/5/9/9/4/
pages59944/p59944-1.php (noting that in all twenty-three instances where FATF blacklisting occurred, 
or was about to occur, FATF compliance was achieved).
87. See Protess & Bray, supra note 19 (highlighting a new settlement for failing to live up to an earlier 
promise to adopt AML measures). Individual countries set fines for violating laws that are designed to 
implement FATF guidelines. See 2012 Recommendations, supra note 23, at 26.
88. Ben Protess, Altered Study Draws Fine for Auditor, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 2014, at B1. A “related 
enterprise” is an entity that facilitates the underlying illegal activity. See id.
89. Id.; see also Public Statement, Fin. Action Task Force, High-Risk and Non-cooperative Jurisdictions (June 27, 
2014), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/high-riskandnon-cooperativejurisdictions/documents/
public-statement-june-2014.html (providing a general list of blacklisted countries, including Iran).
90. Protess, supra note 88.
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iV. thE fatf: gatEKEEping and LaWYEr EthiCs—rEfLECtiOns
 A. Gatekeeping 
 A decade after its genesis, the FATF identified several professions—such as 
accountants and lawyers—as “gatekeepers” who were capable of assisting the FATF in 
carrying out its mission.91 Recommendation 22 labels such professions as DNFBPs92 
and transfers to them many of the same AML and CTF responsibilities in the preceding 
Recommendations that apply primarily to financial institutions.93
 The underlying rationale for lawyer gatekeeping is that lawyers are in a special 
position to monitor and shape both current and prospective client behavior by 
counseling them to follow the law.94 Lawyers’ specialized training in the art of 
communication and persuasion, high professional ethics standards, and commitment to 
justice and the public good95 make them an attractive choice to be societal gatekeepers.96 
91. Fin. Action Task Force, RBA Guidance for Legal Professionals ¶ 11 (2008) [hereinafter FATF 
RBA], available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/RBA%20Legal%20professions.
pdf (“Lawyers hold a unique position in society by providing access to law and justice for individuals and 
entities  .  .  .  .”). For a general example of how U.S. policy has balanced the FATF Recommendations on 
“gatekeepers” with the legal profession’s concerns about the attorney-client relationship, see the prepared 
remarks of Treasury Deputy Secretary Stuart Eizenstat before a congressional committee in 2000:
We are aggressively pursuing programs aimed at the lawyers, accountants and auditors 
who function as “gatekeepers” to the financial system. While legal rules properly 
insulate professional consultations from overly broad scrutiny and create a zone of safety 
within which professionals can advise their clients, those rules should not create a cover 
for criminal conduct.
 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Deputy Secretary Stuart Eizenstat House 
Committee on Banking and Financial Services. (Mar. 9, 2000), available at http://www.treasury.gov/
press-center/press-releases/Pages/ls445.aspx; see also Paton, supra note 4, at 171 (discussing the 
conception of the role of lawyer as “gatekeeper” and its close relationship to the “role of government in 
determining the parameters of professional responsibility and regulation of the legal profession”); 
Shepherd, supra note 4, at 89; Terry, Intro to the 2008 FATF Lawyer Guidance, supra note 4, at 9–10; 
Good Practices Guidance, supra note 9, at 1.
92. 2012 Recommendations, supra note 23, at 19.
93. Good Practices Guidance, supra note 9, at 2. Examples of DNFBPs include “lawyers, notaries, trust 
and company service providers (‘TCSPs’), real estate agents, accountants, and auditors.” Id. at 1.
94. Formal Opinion 463, supra note 23, at 1 (“The underlying theory behind the ‘lawyer-as-gatekeeper’ 
idea is that the lawyer has the capacity to monitor and to control, or at least to inf luence, the conduct of 
his or her clients and prospective clients in order to deter wrongdoing.”); Shepherd, supra note 4, at 88 
n.28 (quoting Fin. Action Task Force, Report on Money Laundering Typologies 2000–2001, at 
12 (2001), available at http://fincen.gov/pdf/fatftypologie.pdf) (noting that lawyers are viewed as good 
“gatekeepers” because of their ability to provide access “to the various functions that might help the 
criminal move or conceal” funds).
95. See Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer 18 (1993) (discussing the lawyer-statesman ideal and the 
classic role of lawyers to serve justice and the public not for personal gain, but to promote the public good).
96. See Elizabeth J. Hubertz, Public Interest, Professional Bargains: Ethical Conflicts Between Lawyers and 
Professional Engineers, 31 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 83, 91 (2009) (quoting Model Code of Prof’l 
Responsibility pmbl. ¶ 13 (2002)) (“Lawyers play a vital role in the preservation of society.”); see also 
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct pmbl. ¶ 13 (2014) [hereinafter Model Rules].
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Although this theory is not new, empirical evidence supporting its efficacy in shaping 
client conduct is difficult to find.
 Lawyer conduct that fails to exhibit a concern for professional ethics, justice, and 
the public good is especially troublesome because lawyers have a special, governmentally 
sanctioned role in protecting individual rights and promoting justice.97 The significant 
increase in external regulation of the profession by governmental and other authorities 
during the last generation is one consequence of lawyers failing this expectation by 
engaging in unethical conduct.98
 The concept that lawyers are gatekeepers has generated considerable debate both 
in the legal academy and the profession.99 The American Bar Association (ABA) 
recently noted this debate in Formal Opinion 463: Client Due Diligence, Money 
Laundering, and Terrorist Financing, which was partly a response to “intergovernmental 
standards-setting organizations and government agencies . . . suggest[ing] that lawyers 
should be ‘gatekeepers’” to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.100 The 
Opinion concluded that the “[r]ules do not mandate that a lawyer perform a 
‘gatekeeper’ role,” but nevertheless endorsed the ABA Voluntary Good Practices 
Guidance for Lawyers to Detect and Combat Money Laundering and Terrorist 
Financing.101 The Guidance provides lawyers with a voluntary, risk-based approach 
consistent with the useful FATF guidelines for CDD.102
 The FATF has pressured the U.S. government to require lawyers to follow more 
closely all of the Recommendations.103 The legal profession has responded, in part, by 
asserting that such pressure is unnecessary since lawyer ethics rules already accomplish 
97. The very first sentence of the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”) underscores 
the fundamental and central notion that lawyers “hav[e] a special responsibility for the quality of justice” 
as “member[s] of the legal profession.” Model Rules, supra note 96, at pmbl. ¶ 1; see also Tim Dare, 
The Counsel of Rogues? A Defence of the Standard Conception of the Lawyer’s Role 1 
(2009) (“Ironically, the profession most obviously charged with the protection and defense of ‘ justice’ is 
commonly regarded as being inimical to that very virtue.”). Dare goes on, however, to argue that lawyers 
have moral grounds for their duties to clients that “may allow or require them to act in ways which 
would be immoral were they acting outside of their professional roles.” Id. at 4; see generally Role of 
Lawyers, supra note 75, at 5 (“[T]he traditional role of lawyers is that of defender of justice and 
representative of individuals before the law[.] [T]he fall-out from lawyers being involved in corrupt 
practices can be far greater than that of other professions, and rightly so.”).
98. See generally John Leubsdorf, Legal Ethics Falls Apart, 57 Buff. L. Rev. 959 (2009).
99. Formal Opinion 463, supra note 23, at 1 (“Many have taken issue with this theory and with the word 
‘gatekeeper.’”) (footnote omitted). The ABA “do[es] not mandate that a lawyer perform a ‘gatekeeper’ 
role” in its Model Rules. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1–4 (commenting on the “usefulness” of the Voluntary Good Practices Guidance to lawyers for 
avoiding unwitting involvement in money laundering and terrorism financing crimes).
102. Id. at 1–2.
103. Good Practices Guidance, supra note 9, at 3 (“The federal government is under pressure from [the] 
FATF and others (including development agencies  .  .  . The World Bank, and the United Nations) to 
adopt legislation implementing some or all of the provisions of the Recommendations . . . .”).
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many of the FATF’s AML and CTF goals.104 Most notably, for example, lawyers may 
not assist clients in their criminal conduct,105 and lawyers risk professional discipline, 
including disbarment, suspension, and even civil or criminal liability, for aiding in 
such conduct.106
 B. Lawyer Ethics Rules, the FATF, and CDD 
 The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”) ref lect, and 
help shape, the legal profession’s behavioral norms.107 Nearly every jurisdiction in the 
United States has adopted the Model Rules to some degree,108 and lawyers must 
follow their jurisdiction’s version or risk being disciplined for ethical transgressions. 
In a sense, these rules and the Recommendations share a common purpose in 
deterring lawyer participation in money laundering and terrorist financing.109 Several 
Model Rules are consistent with—and arguably promote—the FATF’s AML and 
CFT goals. In particular, Recommendation 10, entitled “Customer Due Diligence 
and Record Keeping,” imposes certain CDD measures on lawyers similar to those 
required by the Model Rules, albeit more generally.110
 The FATF’s CDD acts like an early warning or detection system for financial 
institutions and lawyers because it produces information regarding the likelihood of 
money laundering and terrorist financing at the outset of the relationship.111 Since 
104. Id. at 2 (noting the intense debate within the profession over concerns that the FATF might “undermine 
the attorney-client privilege or the duty of client confidentiality or otherwise impede the delivery of 
legal services generally”).
105. Model Rules, supra note 96, R. 8.4(b).
106. See, e.g., Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Kellogg, 933 N.E.2d 1085 (Ohio 2010) (suspending a lawyer convicted 
of money laundering); Disciplinary Counsel v. Gittinger, 929 N.E.2d 410 (Ohio 2010) (suspending an 
attorney convicted of money laundering and conspiracy to commit bank fraud).
107. See Jack P. Sahl, Real Metamorphosis or More of the Same: Navigating the Practice of Law in the Wake of 
Ethics 20/20, 47 Akron L. Rev. 1, 22 (2013) (Andrew Perlman, chief reporter for Ethics 20/20, “stated 
that marketplace developments are the ‘predominant’ reason for changes in [lawyers’] behavioral norms 
and that ‘ethics rule changes reinforce those normative developments in the marketplace and may even 
cause some changes in the marketplace.’ Perlman does not think ‘it’s a one-way direction’”).
108. See State Adoption of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Am. B. Ass’n, http://www.americanbar.
org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/alpha_list_
state_adopting_model_rules.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2015) [hereinafter ABA State Adoption].
109. See Schott, supra note 16, at VI-2. (noting that, in an earlier version of the Recommendations, many of 
the same preventative measures could be found in Recommendations 5 through 25).
110. Recommendation 22 directs lawyers and other DNFBPs to follow the CDD and reporting requirements 
aimed primarily at f inancial institutions as set out in earlier Recommendations. See 2012 
Recommendations, supra note 23, at 19–20. Recommendation 22 specifically cites Recommendations 
10, 11, 12, 15, and 17 as containing the CDD and reporting provisions. Id. DNFBPs also include: 
casinos, real estate agents, and dealers in precious metals or stones and trust and company service 
providers—for example, persons acting as a formation agent or as a director or partner of a trust or 
company, as well as notaries, who are listed in the same subsection as lawyers. Id.
111. Both the FATF and the legal profession’s CDD standards also increase the chances for money laundering 
and terrorism financing detection later in the attorney-client relationship because both regulatory regimes 
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the CDD standards apply to all DNFBPs, the FATF creates an army of professionals 
to serve on the front line of information gathering with respect to money laundering 
and terrorist financing.112 As “front-line professionals,” these DNFBPs “furnish 
access to the various [commercial, financial, and governmental] functions that might 
help criminals move or conceal funds.”113 Potential money launderers or terrorist 
financiers likely need to involve DNFBPs—especially lawyers—in the early stages of 
their criminal scheme to avoid mistakes that may draw attention to them, which 
underscores the need to identify such suspicious activity at its onset.
 Recommendation 22 specifically requires lawyers and other DNFBPs to follow the 
FATF’s CDD directives beginning in Recommendation 10. These directives require 
lawyers to follow CDD procedures when “prepar[ing] for or carry[ing] out 
transactions . . . concerning the following activities: (1) buying and selling of real estate; 
(2) managing of client money, securities or other assets; (3) management of bank, savings 
or securities accounts; (4) organisation of contributions for the creation, operation or 
management of companies; [and] (5) [the] creation, operation or management of legal 
persons or arrangements, and buying and selling of business entities.”114
 The CDD outlined in the Recommendations preceding Recommendation 22 is 
comprehensive and well-suited to achieving the FATF’s AML and CFT goals.115 
For example, CDD procedures in Recommendation 10 require lawyers to: verify the 
customer’s identity using reliable independent source documents, data, or information; 
identify the beneficial owner of the customer; understand the purpose and intended 
nature of the customer’s business or, in the case of lawyers, their professional 
relationship to the client; and conduct ongoing due diligence throughout the 
relationship to ensure that the transactions being conducted are consistent with the 
lawyer’s knowledge of the client and the client’s business and risk profile. This 
ongoing duty also extends to ensuring that the client’s source of funds is consistent 
with the lawyer’s knowledge of the client’s legitimate endeavors. When the lawyer 
cannot comply with the due diligence above, Recommendation 10 directs the lawyer 
to terminate the relationship.116
 The level of necessary due diligence depends on the client’s identity, the countries 
involved, and the type of service requested.117 Lawyers must apply their independent 
require lawyers to continue monitoring their customer relationships. See 2012 Recommendations, supra 
note 23, at 14 (mandating “ongoing due diligence on the business relationship and scrutiny of transactions 
undertaken throughout the course of that relationship to ensure that the transactions being conducted are 
consistent with the institution’s knowledge of the customer, their business and risk profile, including, 
where necessary, the source of funds”).
112. See 2012 Recommendations, supra note 23, at 19.
113. Formal Opinion 463, supra note 23, at 1 n.2.
114. 2012 Recommendations, supra note 23, at 19–20.
115. Id. at 14–16, 17, 18 (CDD and reporting provisions).
116. Id. at 14–15.
117. The ABA Voluntary Good Practices Guidance notes “three major risk categories [for] legal engagements: 
(a) country/geographic risk, (b) service risk, and (c) client risk.” Good Practices Guidance, supra note 
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judgment in weighing each of these risk categories. The overall assessment will 
inevitably “vary from one lawyer or firm to another because of the size, sophistication, 
location, and nature and scope of services offered by the lawyer or the firm.”118
 C. The Intersection: Lawyer Ethics Rules and the FATF
 Although less detailed than the FATF requirements, lawyers are currently 
obligated to engage in their own type of CDD. Model Rule 1.1 requires lawyers 
to—at minimum—be competent in delivering legal services.119 Competency is a 
multifaceted concept and arguably involves more than simply being a good legal 
technician or knowledgeable in legal doctrine and procedure. It also involves 
empathizing with the human dimensions of the client’s problems in an attempt to 
support, counsel, and help the client reach a positive resolution of his problem.
 Competency begins at either the initial interview or the intake stage, when Rule 
1.2 requires the lawyer to reach a clear understanding with the client regarding the 
scope of legal services to be provided.120 Further, the lawyer bears the burden of 
effectively establishing the parameters of the representation with the client under Rule 
1.4.121 The client-intake stage, in many ways, is the cornerstone of the attorney-client 
relationship. The lawyer learns important facts about the client and the client’s problem, 
identifies the legal issues, starts to formulate a representation strategy, considers 
possible conflict of interests (both business and professional), and makes an initial 
assessment of the client’s personality.122 For example, does the client impress the lawyer 
as articulate and trustworthy? Also during the client-intake stage, important 
professional and administrative matters are covered, and hopefully memorialized, 
concerning fees, expenses, billing protocol, the ongoing responsibility of both lawyer 
and client to communicate, and the confidentiality of their communications.
9, at 15. For a helpful discussion of each risk category, see id. at 119–30. See also Shepherd, supra note 4, 
at 94; Terry, Intro to the 2008 FATF Lawyer Guidance, supra note 4, at 16 & nn.88–89.
118. Shepherd, supra note 4, at 94.
119. The Model Rules have been adopted with some modifications by every state in the nation. See ABA State 
Adoption, supra note 108.
120. Model Rules, supra note 96, R. 1.1 (Competence), R. 1.2 (Scope of Representation); see Jack P. Sahl, A 
2014 Update: What Every Entertainment Lawyer Needs to Know—How to Avoid Being the Target of a Legal 
Malpractice Claim or Disciplinary Action, in 1 Practising L. Inst., Counseling Clients in the 
Entertainment Industry 2014, at 1-1069, 1-1105 (2014) [hereinafter Counseling Clients] 
(“[C]ompetent handling of a matter starts with the initial client and case screening.”).
121. Model Rules, supra note 96, R. 1.4(a)(3), (5) (directing the lawyer “to keep the client reasonably 
informed about the status of the [representation]” and to “consult . . . about any relevant limitation on 
the lawyer’s conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by the 
[Model Rules] or other law”); see id. R. 1.2.
122. See Sahl, supra note 120, at 1-1084 (emphasizing the importance of screening a client at the intake stage 
and listing steps for minimizing the likelihood of a malpractice or disciplinary action).
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 Rule 1.18 imposes a duty on lawyers to protect confidential communications with 
a prospective client, even if an attorney-client relationship is never formed.123 This 
significant ethical obligation is designed to facilitate the flow of information from the 
client as early as possible and set a precedent for the entire professional relationship, 
promoting better-informed decisionmaking by the lawyer and a better understanding 
of the client’s identity and needs.124
 It is also important at the intake stage to highlight Rule 1.2(d), which prohibits 
the lawyer from assisting a client in fraudulent or criminal conduct.125 Rule 8.4 
expressly identifies such assistance as “misconduct,” and further states that any 
attempt to circumvent an ethics rule subjects the lawyer to professional discipline 
and possible termination of the relationship.126 The intake stage provides a special 
opportunity for the lawyer to remind the client at the outset that, although they have 
a professional relationship, he is bound both ethically and legally by Rule 1.2(d).127 
The confluence of the mandates in Rules 1.1, 1.2(d), and 8.4 should result in the 
lawyer obtaining substantial client information and underscoring his duty to refrain 
from facilitating any illegal conduct the client may wish to carry out. This result is 
designed to accomplish the same AML and CFT goals reflected in the FATF CDD 
directives for DNFBPs.128
 The lawyer may also wish to discuss Rule 1.16(a)(1) at the intake stage because this 
rule prohibits him from performing services that violate any law or ethical rule129 and 
123. Model Rules, supra note 96, R. 1.18. Model Rule 1.18(b) recognizes that, under Model Rule 1.9, 
information concerning a former client may be revealed, which constitutes an exception to the general 
rule against revealing information learned in consultation with a prospective client. Id. R. 1.18(b)
124. See Sahl, supra note 120, at 1-1082 n.33. “Honest and full communication with the lawyer is promoted 
by educating the client about the attorney-client evidentiary privilege and the lawyer’s ethical obligation 
to protect information relating to representation. It is important that the lawyer discuss these concepts 
and their limitations with the client as soon as possible.” Id.
125. Good Practices Guidance, supra note 9, at 8 (“CDD is not intended to place the lawyer in an 
adversarial relationship with the client; rather, the purpose is to make sure the lawyer knows the true 
identity and business goals of the client.” (emphasis added)); see also FATF RBA, supra note 91, at 31–32 
(containing a principal at paragraph 114 under the subheading, “Customer Due Diligence/Know Your 
Customer,” and “intend[ing] to enable a legal professional to form a reasonable belief that [he] has 
appropriate awareness of the true identity of each client”).
126. Model Rules, supra note 96, R. 8.4(a)–(c). It is also misconduct “to knowingly assist or induce another [to 
violate, or attempt to violate, the Model Rules], or do so through the acts of another.” Id. R. 8.4(a).
127. Counseling Clients, supra note 120, at 1-1078 to -1079.
128. See Formal Opinion 463, supra note 23.
129. Model Rules, supra note 96, R. 1.16(a)(1). Lawyers representing organizations, such as real estate 
partnerships or charities, may wish to inform their entity clients that they cannot facilitate unlawful 
client conduct, such as money laundering, and that they may have to report any information regarding 
such conduct to higher authorities in the organization. Id. R. 1.13(b). Entity lawyers are even authorized 
to reveal confidential information relating to the representation of persons outside the organization 
if “necessary to prevent substantial injury to the organization.” Id. R. 1.13(c)(2). See generally Louise L. 
Hill, The Financial Action Task Force Guidance for Legal Professionals: Missed Opportunities to Level the 
Playing Field, J. Prof. Law., 2010, at 163 (criticizing the FATF’s decision to exclude in-house counsel 
from the definition of legal professionals and, thus, not subject to the Recommendations); Paul D. Paton, 
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requires him to withdraw if he has already undertaken representation.130 Raising the 
possibility of withdrawal at the intake stage sends the client a powerful message 
regarding the lawyer’s continuing ethical obligations to avoid illegal conduct, which 
promotes a positive ethical tone for the duration of the attorney-client relationship.131
 The possibility of withdrawal from representation under Rule 1.16 may raise 
questions, however, about the lawyer’s duty to protect client information. Rule 1.6 
generally prohibits the lawyer from revealing client information that could be 
harmful or embarrassing to the client.132 However, Rules 1.6(b)(1) through (3) permit 
the lawyer to reveal client information in certain circumstances, including to prevent 
reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm to a third party.133 The lawyer 
may also reveal information under Rule 1.6(b)(2) “to prevent the client from 
committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury 
to the financial interests or property of another” when the client has used or is using 
the lawyer’s services to further the activity.134 Rule 1.6(b)(3) permits similar 
disclosures to rectify or mitigate substantial injury to the financial and property 
interests referenced in Rule 1.6(b)(2) if the client has used the lawyer’s services to 
commit a crime or fraud.135 These three exceptions to the duty of confidentiality 
provide substantial breathing room for the lawyer to disclose client information with 
respect to money laundering and terrorist financing, which furthers, in effect, the 
FATF’s efforts to prevent these crimes.136
 In addition to Rule 1.6’s protection of client confidences and other information, 
the attorney-client evidentiary privilege also protects against the disclosure of 
confidential client communications.137 While the scope of the attorney-client 
Corporate Counsel as Corporate Conscience: Ethics and Integrity in the Post-Enron Era, 84 Canadian B. Rev. 
533 (2006) (discussing the heightened tensions and demands on in-house lawyers and their ethical 
responsibilities).
130. Model Rules, supra note 96, R. 1.16. Model Rule 1.16(a) provides mandatory withdrawal provisions; 
Model Rules 1.16(b)(1) and (2) permit a lawyer to withdraw if “the client persists in a course of action 
involving the lawyer’s services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent” or if “the 
client has used the lawyer’s services to perpetrate a crime or fraud.” Id.
131. Lawyer withdrawal must be accomplished in a manner that minimizes harm to the client, such as 
protecting client confidences. See id. R. 1.16(b), (d).
132. Id. R. 1.6.
133. Id. R. 1.6(b)(1).
134. Id. R. 1.6(b)(2).
135. Id. R. 1.6(b)(3).
136. The client must be using, or has used, the lawyer’s services in connection with the commission of the 
crimes before the lawyer may reveal the information under Model Rules 1.6(b)(2) and (3). There is no 
similar limitation under Rule 1.6(b)(1) concerning the lawyer’s disclosure of client information to 
prevent reasonably certain death or bodily injury—arguably a “reasonably certain result” from the 
financing of terrorism. Model Rules, supra note 96, R. 1.6.
137. See In re Richard Roe, Inc., 68 F.3d 38, 40 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[I]t is well-established that communications that 
otherwise would be protected by the attorney-client privilege or the attorney work product privilege are not 
protected if they relate to client communications in furtherance of contemplated or ongoing criminal or 
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evidentiary privilege is different than the ethical rules, it too does not protect a 
client’s confidential communications in the furtherance of a crime.138 Thus, since the 
FATF policy defers to members’ policies regarding privileged attorney-client 
communications,139 U.S. lawyers are not required to keep confidential client 
communications that facilitate money laundering or terrorist financing.140
 CDD is a fundamental obligation for any entity or professional furthering the 
FATF’s AML and CFT goals.141 Similarly, CDD constitutes a core ethical 
responsibility for lawyers delivering competent legal services. This duopoly of concern 
with CDD highlights the common ground between the legal profession and the FATF 
in helping lawyers to avoid unwittingly assisting clients in money laundering and 
terrorist financing schemes.142 Of course, there will be some lawyers who will 
knowingly aid miscreants in these crimes.143 No amount of CDD—under the FATF 
regime, the Model Rules, or otherwise—will deter them from their criminal ends. 
“Bad apples” aside, the current CDD regimes in both the FATF and legal ethics codes 
fraudulent conduct.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Marc Rich & Co. v. United States (In re 
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum dated September 15, 1983), 731 F.2d 1032, 1038 (2d Cir. 1984))).
138. See id. at 40; see generally Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics §§ 6.1–.7 (1986) (discussing 
both the ethical obligation of confidentiality and the attorney-client evidentiary privilege).
139. 2012 Recommendations, supra note 23, at 83 (“Lawyers  .  .  . are not required to report suspicious 
transactions if the relevant information was obtained in circumstances where they are subject to 
professional secrecy or legal professional privilege.”); see also Shepherd, supra note 4, at 90 n.32 (noting 
that the FATF “opposed any law or regulation that would compel lawyers to disclose privileged or 
confidential information to government officials based on ‘suspicious’ activity of the client, or otherwise 
compromise the attorney-client relationship or independence of the bar”).
140. See supra notes 132–35 and accompanying text. ABA Formal Opinion 463 notes that lawyers are ethically 
prohibited from filing STRs about clients. Formal Opinion 463, supra note 23. While this is a good 
policy, the attorney-client evidentiary privilege does not protect client communications for the purpose of 
furthering criminal activity. Model Rule 1.6(b)(3) permits lawyers to disclose communications if the 
lawyer reasonably believes that disclosure is reasonably necessary “to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial 
injury to the financial interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted 
from the client’s commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer’s 
services.” Model Rules, supra note 96, R. 1.6(b)(3). The Rules also allow disclosure when necessary “to 
prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud” under similar conditions. Id. R. 1.6(b)(2).
141. See 2012 Recommendations, supra note 23, at 19–20. Recommendation 20 states that if a bank 
suspects that “funds are the proceeds of a criminal activity, or are related to terrorist financing, it should 
be required, by law, to report promptly its suspicions” to authorities. Id. at 19.
142. See Lawton P. Cummings & Paul T. Stepnowsky, My Brother’s Keeper: An Empirical Study of Attorney 
Facilitation of Money Laundering Through Commercial Transactions, J. Prof. Law., 2011, at 30–34.
143. See, e.g., Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Kranitz (In re Kranitz), 848 N.W.2d 292 (Wis. 2014) 
(disciplining a lawyer convicted of securities fraud by suspending his license for two years); Office of 
Lawyer Regulation v. Berman (In re Berman), 841 N.W.2d 50 (Wis. 2014) (same); Office of Lawyer 
Regulation v. Stern (In re Stern), 830 N.W.2d 674 (Wis. 2013) (lawyer involved in assisting client in 
bankruptcy convicted of money laundering); see also Richmond v. N.H. Sup. Ct. Comm. on Prof ’l 
Conduct, 542 F.3d 913 (1st Cir. 2008) (noting that the state supreme court had inherent power to 
regulate the profession for violating the professional conduct rules); Terry, supra note 21, at 499 & 
nn.55–56 (listing several cases and revealing that lawyers have been convicted of money-laundering and 
terrorist financing, with some lawyers “mastermind[ing] the money laundering schemes” and others 
“appear[ing] to have been brought into these criminal schemes by their clients or other associates”).
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should significantly protect both the bar and the public from lawyers unwittingly 
participating in money laundering and terrorist financing crimes.
V. COnCLUsiOn
 The FATF and its policies promise to generate increased governmental and 
public attention as the world grapples with the ever-persistent crimes of money 
laundering and terrorist financing, especially with the latter seemingly spiraling both 
in the amount of money involved and horror of the crimes it facilitates.144 This 
attention is especially likely in the United States where the FATF, along with 
development agencies such as The World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund, are pressuring the U.S. government “to adopt legislation implementing . . . the 
Recommendations [that] relat[e] to the legal profession.”145 In addition, a New York 
federal court has held for the first time that terrorist attack victims and their families 
could recover damages from an international bank for knowingly processing 
transactions that supported the attacks.146 This decision should lead both the public 
and the bar to pay more attention to terrorist financing and make banks more 
cautious when processing financial transactions with potential terrorist links.147
 The legal profession’s attention to the FATF is poignantly illustrated by the 
ABA’s adoption of the Voluntary Good Practices Guidance148 and the related Formal 
Opinion 463.149 These guidelines, in particular, offer lawyers a valuable tool for 
“designing and implementing effective risk-based approaches consistent with the 
144. See, e.g., Scott Bronstein & Drew Griffin, Self-Funded and Deep-Rooted: How ISIS Makes Its Millions, 
CNN (Oct. 7, 2014, 9:54 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/06/world/meast/isis-funding/ (noting 
that ISIS “probably makes between $1 million and $2 million per day, but probably on the lower end”); 
Andy Brownfield, Luxury Cars, Foreign Buyers and a First-of-Its Kind Ruling in Cincinnati, Cinc. Bus. 
Courier (June 12, 2014, 1:08 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/cincinnati/news/2014/06/12/luxury-
cars-foreign-buyers-and-a-first-of-its-kind.html (reporting a federal court decision concerning the 
seizure of luxury vehicles and the “nationwide effort by the U.S. Secret Service and Department of 
Homeland Security to crack down on the so-called ‘gray market’ of American companies buying luxury 
vehicles stateside for resale overseas,” for fear that foreign purchasers are laundering money).
145. Good Practices Guidance, supra note 9, at 3.
146. Stephanie Clifford & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Terrorism Trial of Mideast Bank Worries the Financial 
World, N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 2014, at A17 (involving 297 plaintiffs who claimed injuries from twenty-
four attacks by the terrorist organization Hamas, and asserting that a branch of the Arab Bank in 
Beirut, Lebanon, knowingly financed Hamas by processing its banking transactions); Stephanie 
Clifford, Hamas Transactions Got Through in Error, Bank Says, N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 2014, at A20.
147. See Stephanie Clifford, Jury Finds Arab Bank Liable for Aiding Terror, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 2014, at A1 
(reporting that a New York District Court jury found Arab Bank, a major Middle Eastern bank, liable for 
supporting terrorist enterprises when it handled transactions for Hamas, which led to multiple attacks).
148. As a direct response to the FATF’s adoption of its Risk Based Approach (RBA) Guidance for Legal 
Professionals, the ABA Voluntary Good Practices Guidance offers U.S. lawyers a more detailed 
direction on the application of the RBA guidelines to specific factual situations, “tak[ing] into account 
the practical realities of the practice of law in an increasingly complex environment.” Good Practices 
Guidance, supra note 9, at 2.
149. The ABA’s Formal Opinion 463 endorsed the Voluntary Good Practices Guidance. Formal Opinion 
463, supra note 23, at 1.
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broad contours of the [FATF] Lawyer Guidance.”150 It provides detailed direction on 
applying the risk-based approach to preventing money laundering and terrorist 
financing in specific practical situations.151 Moreover, the ongoing efforts of the 
ABA Gatekeeper Task Force promise to help shape the profession’s involvement with 
various governmental and private entities that ensure FATF compliance by keeping 
the profession apprised of FATF developments.
 Even with this backdrop of heightened attention to money laundering, terrorist 
financing, and the FATF, there is concern that attorneys in the field will resist making 
necessary changes to their practice.152 Traditionally, the legal profession has resisted 
any regulation by external forces—governmental or private.153 According to 
sociologists and other experts studying professional culture, lawyers (like other 
professionals) claim that their specialized training154 and ethics code155 warrant their 
150. Good Practices Guidance, supra note 9, at 3.
151. Id.
152. James E. Moliterno, Ethics 20/20 Successfully Achieved Its Mission: It “Protected, Preserved, and 
Maintained”, 47 Akron L. Rev. 149, 160–61 (2014) (“The profession has resisted change” during its 
“history of . . . self-regulation,” and the changes made were “in service of the status quo”).
153. Id. (concluding that generally a “change [to the legal profession] has been forced by inf luences of society, 
culture, technology, economics, and globalization, and not by the profession itself ”); see Leubsdorf, 
supra note 98, at 1018 (“Section 307 of [the] Sarbanes-Oxley [Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 
Stat. 745, 784] required the SEC to issue rules requiring lawyers to report material breaches of securities 
law or of fiduciary duty to the corporation’s chief counsel or chief executive officer, and if they did not 
respond appropriately to go to a committee of the board of directors.”). For example, in order to avoid 
legislation and continue self-regulation, Canada’s legal regulators recently passed two reforms, the “No 
Cash” rule and the “Know Your Client” rule, in an effort to address the FATF Recommendations. For 
a more in-depth analysis of Canada’s legal reform in light of the Recommendations and its implication 
of self-regulation, see Paton, supra note 4.
154. [T]he professional project tends toward the monopolization of opportunities for income 
in a market of services or labor and toward the monopolization of status and work 
privileges in an occupational hierarchy. The necessary means to these ends is the 
control and monopolization of relatively standardized professional education. The 
institutionalized production of professional producers mediates and reveals the 
contradictions inherent in the structure of the professional project. 
 Magali Sarfatti Larson, The Rise of Professionalism 51 (1977); see also Eliot Freidson, 
Professional Powers: A Study of the Institutionalization of Formal Knowledge (1986).
Since the nineteenth century  .  .  . some kind of formal higher education marks 
professionals off from other workers, distinguishing both the nature of their training 
and the nature of their skill. Such education is a basic credential for professionals; it 
delineates the foundation of their expertise. The distinction has lain at the root of 
thinking about professions as a special class or category of occupations.
 Id. at 26; William Sullivan et al., Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession of 
Law 21–22 (2007) (“A significant mark of professional privilege and social responsibility is the authority 
that professions wield to require of their members training in specialized institutions and to assess the 
fitness of candidates for admission to practice.”).
155. See Jonathan Macey, Occupation Code 541110: Lawyers, Self-Regulation, and the Idea of a Profession, 74 
Fordham L. Rev. 1079, 1084 (2005) (“Given the contours of this ethical dilemma, rules of professional 
conduct are valuable because such rules solve the prisoners’ dilemma facing lawyers. If the sanctions for 
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deciding how best to deliver their services and to protect the public’s interest.156 This 
claim supports the bar’s ongoing monitoring of the FATF’s efforts, which may 
fundamentally alter the profession’s historic role in protecting clients’ rights and access 
to justice.
 For example, the bar correctly resisted the FATF’s efforts to impose a duty on 
lawyers to file STRs.157 The bar needs to recognize, however, that such resistance is 
unwarranted with respect to the FATF’s CDD principles, which promote both 
lawyers’ and the public’s interests. The FATF’s CDD protects lawyers from 
unwittingly assisting clients with money laundering or terrorist financing crimes.
 Educating lawyers about the FATF and the risks associated with the crimes of 
money laundering and terrorist financing is important if the bar hopes to preclude 
governmental entities under pressure from the FATF from regulating the delivery of 
legal services. One way to inform the bar is to incorporate the FATF’s CDD into law 
school legal ethics courses, which are required courses that are especially well-suited 
for examining good lawyer practices. The ABA Voluntary Good Practices Guidance 
two-page Client Intake Form (CIF) is a particularly effective way to introduce 
students to the CDD procedures advocated by the FATF.158 The CIF underscores 
the increasingly globalized nature of legal practice, the risks involved, and the need 
to develop good practice protocols. For example, the CIF’s procedures provide 
specific questions for identifying both the “natural person client”159 and the “entity 
client,”160 and recommend checking the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s Specially 
unprofessionalism are high enough, then lawyers and law firms no longer would have any incentive to 
cheat by acting unprofessionally.”).
156. See Fred C. Zacharias, The Myth of Self-Regulation, 93 Minn. L. Rev. 1147, 1148 n.9 (2009) (“The 
public must have confidence that the legal profession, which is self-regulated, will not look the other 
way when its members break the law.”).
157. See supra notes 23, 71–75 and accompanying text; see also Formal Opinion 463, supra note 23, at 1 
(rejecting the filing of STRs as unethical).
158. Good Practices Guidance, supra note 9, at 38.
[D]epending upon the nature of the representation and level of initial concern the 
lawyer may have regarding the intentions or background of the client, the lawyer may 
need to obtain some or all of the following information: the client’s name, employment 
background, place of birth, prior residential addresses, current residential address, 
business address, phone numbers, date of birth, marital status, names of prior or current 
spouses and/or names of children, dates of birth and social security numbers of any 
such spouses and/or children, the name and contact information of any other lawyers 
with whom the client regularly deals, the name and contact information of the client’s 
certified public accountant, prior criminal convictions, pending lawsuits, and status of 
tax filings with governmental authorities.
Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. Under certain circumstances, the guidelines recommend investigating the entity’s “beneficial 
ownership, as discussed in more detail in the main body of this guidance.” Id. at 39.
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Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List.161 These CDD suggestions are the 
kind of good practice skills that law schools should be imparting to their students.162 
In short, the CIF simply lays out a sound roadmap for practicing law regardless of the 
practice field or the degree of risk involved in representing a client.
 In addition to law schools teaching students about the FATF, courts and bar 
associations should help inform lawyers about the FATF and its policies.163 For 
example, the ABA Gatekeeper Task Force should continue its important mission of 
educating U.S. lawyers about FATF issues.164 Ideally, the practicing bar and legal 
academia would collaborate to offer conferences focusing on the FATF, similar to 
the symposium held at New York Law School.165 To be sure, lawyers who learn about 
the FATF and adopt the CDD procedures outlined in the CIF will be less likely to 
unwittingly become involved in money laundering, terrorist financing, or other 
criminal schemes. The time for the bar to act and to answer the call for CDD change 
is now—not later.
161. Id. at 39 (“It would also be prudent for the lawyer to check the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s Specially 
Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list  .  .  . for the name of the client, the client’s spouse, the 
client’s beneficial owners, and/or other related persons, and any relevant business entities.”).
162. See generally Douglas Godfrey, Transactional Skills Training: All About Due Diligence, 10 Tenn. J. Bus. L. 
357 (2009) (suggesting how due diligence training can be incorporated into a law student’s training).
163. See Terry, supra note 21, at 505 (“There also have been concerted efforts to educate ethics experts . . . . The 
goal is to have a ‘cradle-to-grave’ approach to [legal ethics] education that begins in law school and 
concludes by educating [those] responsible for disciplining lawyers.” (citations omitted)).
164. See id. (highlighting existing sources and recommending additional ways to inform lawyers about the 
FATF).
165. New York Law School Law Review Symposium: Combating Threats to the International Financial 
System: The Financial Action Task Force (Apr. 25, 2014). For more information and recordings of this 
symposium, visit: http://www.nylslawreview.com/fatf/.
